Western Sahara - Sahara Occidental -

Sobre el plan de autonomía de Baker
El diario madrileño "El País" consagra un artículo a las revelaciones sobre el Plan de Paz para el Sáhara Occidental que Marrack Goulding ha publicado en su reciente libro "Peacemonger". Goulding, antiguo subsecretario encargado de misiones de paz de la ONU, ocupó ese puesto cuando Baker fue designado por Annan en 1997 como su representante especial. Marrack Goulging declara en su libro que Annan le encargó ponerse en contacto con Baker para convencerle de que aceptara la misión de ser su Enviado personal e intentara negociar un acuerdo de autonomía del Sáhara Occidental en el seno de Marruecos. Cita como prueba una carta de Annan a Baker. En una entrevista a "El País", Goulding llega incluso a decir que en realidad se trataba de retomar un plan anterior de Pérez de Cuéllar, predecesor de Kofi Annan.

A propos du plan d'autonomie de Baker
Le quotidien madrilène "El País" consacre un article aux révélations sur le Plan de paix pour le Sahara Occidental que Marrack Goulding a publié dans son récent livre "Peacemonger". L'ancien sous-secrétaire chargé des missions de la paix à l'ONU, en fonction lors de la nomination de Baker par Annan en 1997, prétend dans son livre que Annan l'avait chargé de contacter Baker, de le convaincre d'accepter la mission d'Envoyé personnel et d'essayer de négocier un accord d'autonomie du SO au sein du Maroc. Il cite comme preuve une lettre de Annan à Baker. Dans l'interview au Pais Goulding va jusqu'à dire qu'il s'agissait en fait d'un plan repris de Perez de Cuellar, prédécesseur de Kofi Annan.

About the Baker Autonomy Plan
The Spanish daily "El País" published an article on the revelations about the Peace Plan for Western Sahara made by Marrack Goulding in his recent book "Peacemonger". The former Under-Secretary in charge of UN Peacekeeping Missions, asserts in his book that Annan asked him to contact Baker, to convince him to accept the mission of Personnal Envoy and to try to negociate an autonomy agreement for Western Sahara in the frame of the Moroccan Kingdom. He quotes a letter Annan sent to Baker. In his interview given to El Pais, Goulding claims the plan was a proposal worked out by former SG Perez de Cuellar.

>> Read extracts from Mr. Goulding's book, Peacemonger, on this issue. (WSOnline)

DOCUMENTS

Press release Western Sahara Campaign UK, 05.05.03 (Word format) NEW

Annan encargó a Baker en 1997 la integración del Sáhara en Marruecos, Un ex funcionario de la ONU desvela en sus memorias las maniobras del secretario general, Tomas Barbulo, El Pais, Madrid, 01.05.03.

Annan avait chargé Baker en 1997 d'intégrer le Sahara Occidental au Maroc, selon un ancien haut fonctionnaire de l'ONU, SPS, 03.05.03.

Kofi Annan veut l'intégration du Sahara occidental au Maroc, A. C., Le Matin, Alger, 04.05.03.

Marrack Goulding: "Peacemonger", 389 p (13 June, 2002), John Murray; ISBN: 071955540X

Original letter from the website : James Baker III - 30 Years of Public Policy. VIRTUAL MUSEUM

Transcription

The Secretary General

5 march 1997

Dear Mr. Baker,

I am writing to confirm the outcome of your recent conversations with myself and Marrack Goulding about the possibility of your undertaking an exploratory mission on my behalf in connexion with the United Nations' efforts to resolve the conflict between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO over the Western Sahara. I am delighted that you have agreed to help me in this way and I have confirmed with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, in a telephone conversation on 27 February, that the Administration is happy with what is proposed.

2
It is against this background that I have asked you to undertake a mission as my Personal Envoy. Th ostensible purpose of your mission will be threefold: to assess, in consultation with the parties, the implementability of the Plan in its present form; to examine, whether they are adjustments, acceptable to the parties, which would significantly improve the chances of implementing it in the near future; and, if not, to advise me on other possible ways of resolving the conflict. It is these terms that I will describe to the parties and to the Security Council the task that I have asked you to undertake.

However, I envisage that if, under the third item of this mandate you judged that there was an alternative and more promising possibility you would endeavour to negotiate a deal on that basis either through direct talks or, more probably, through shuttle diplomacy. Such a deal could subsequently be submitted to the people for approval in a referendum conducted by the United Nations. The basis for such a deal could be agreement by Morocco to give the Western Sahara a greater deal of autonomy the country's other regions, together with a special status for the POLISARIO leadership, in return for which POLISARIO would agree to the Territory being part of Morocco. But you may be able to identify other and more promising options.

You will report to me direct. I would like you to copy your written reports to the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr. Kieran Prendergast, who will have day-to-day responsability for supporting your mission. But I accept that if you succeed in getting a negociation going there will be sensitive matters which you will not wish to discuss in writing. In such cases you should report to me by telephone . I have deliberately expressed your mandate in rather general terms and I encourage you to send me the recommandations you consider most appropriate, however inconvenient they may be for me politically.

I place no constraints on the way in which you carry out your mission, other than to ask you to bear in mind that I am accountable to the Security Council for my efforts to implement the Settlement Plan. This means in practice that I must ask you to keep me fully informed about your activities, to consult me in advance about any significant initiative you plan to take and to accept that I might, on rare occasions, have to ask you not to act until I had consulted the Security Council or even not to act at all.

3
Subject to this proviso, I will ensure that you are permitted to carry out your mission as you deem fit.

I understand that you would be able to make your first trip to the area in the period from 19 to 30 April, that you would thereafter report to me on your initial conclusions and that you would be able to spend most of June on this assignment. I also understand that you would not exclude continuing involvement thereafter if progress was being made but that this would be for discussion between us at the time.

Mr. Prendergast, who took over Mr. Goulding's responsibilities on 1 March, will be in touch with you shortly about the various practical matters you have discussed with Mr. Goulding. He will also give you advance sight of the letter in which I will report to the Security Council my decision to ask you to undertake this assignment.

Yours sincerely,
Kofi A. Annan

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Press release Western Sahara Campaign UK, 05.05.03 (Word format) *NEW*
Annan encargó a Baker en 1997 la integración del Sáhara en Marruecos, Un ex funcionario de la ONU desvela en sus memorias las maniobras del secretario general, Tomas Barbulo, El Pais, Madrid, 01.05.03.
Annan avait chargé Baker en 1997 d'intégrer le Sahara Occidental au Maroc, selon un ancien haut fonctionnaire de l'ONU, SPS, 03.05.03.
Kofi Annan veut l'intégration du Sahara occidental au Maroc, A. C., Le Matin, Alger, 04.05.03.
Marrack Goulding: "Peacemonger", 389 p (13 June, 2002), John Murray; ISBN: 071955540X
Original letter from the website : James Baker III - 30 Years of Public Policy. VIRTUAL MUSEUM	Transcription
	The Secretary General 5 march 1997 Dear Mr. Baker, I am writing to confirm the outcome of your recent conversations with myself and Marrack Goulding about the possibility of your undertaking an exploratory mission on my behalf in connexion with the United Nations' efforts to resolve the conflict between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO over the Western Sahara. I am delighted that you have agreed to help me in this way and I have confirmed with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, in a telephone conversation on 27 February, that the Administration is happy with what is proposed.
	2 It is against this background that I have asked you to undertake a mission as my Personal Envoy. Th ostensible purpose of your mission will be threefold: to assess, in consultation with the parties, the implementability of the Plan in its present form; to examine, whether they are adjustments, acceptable to the parties, which would significantly improve the chances of implementing it in the near future; and, if not, to advise me on other possible ways of resolving the conflict. It is these terms that I will describe to the parties and to the Security Council the task that I have asked you to undertake. However, I envisage that if, under the third item of this mandate you judged that there was an alternative and more promising possibility you would endeavour to negotiate a deal on that basis either through direct talks or, more probably, through shuttle diplomacy. Such a deal could subsequently be submitted to the people for approval in a referendum conducted by the United Nations. The basis for such a deal could be agreement by Morocco to give the Western Sahara a greater deal of autonomy the country's other regions, together with a special status for the POLISARIO leadership, in return for which POLISARIO would agree to the Territory being part of Morocco. But you may be able to identify other and more promising options. You will report to me direct. I would like you to copy your written reports to the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr. Kieran Prendergast, who will have day-to-day responsability for supporting your mission. But I accept that if you succeed in getting a negociation going there will be sensitive matters which you will not wish to discuss in writing. In such cases you should report to me by telephone . I have deliberately expressed your mandate in rather general terms and I encourage you to send me the recommandations you consider most appropriate, however inconvenient they may be for me politically. I place no constraints on the way in which you carry out your mission, other than to ask you to bear in mind that I am accountable to the Security Council for my efforts to implement the Settlement Plan. This means in practice that I must ask you to keep me fully informed about your activities, to consult me in advance about any significant initiative you plan to take and to accept that I might, on rare occasions, have to ask you not to act until I had consulted the Security Council or even not to act at all.
	3 Subject to this proviso, I will ensure that you are permitted to carry out your mission as you deem fit. I understand that you would be able to make your first trip to the area in the period from 19 to 30 April, that you would thereafter report to me on your initial conclusions and that you would be able to spend most of June on this assignment. I also understand that you would not exclude continuing involvement thereafter if progress was being made but that this would be for discussion between us at the time. Mr. Prendergast, who took over Mr. Goulding's responsibilities on 1 March, will be in touch with you shortly about the various practical matters you have discussed with Mr. Goulding. He will also give you advance sight of the letter in which I will report to the Security Council my decision to ask you to undertake this assignment. Yours sincerely, Kofi A. Annan