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Faisant suite à mon courrier cité en référence, j'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que le rapport du Secrétaire-Général sur la situation dans la région du Sahel incluant la stratégie intégrée onusienne pour le Sahel a été circulée aux membres du Conseil de Sécurité, en prévision du briefing du 26 juillet 2013.

Ce document, tant attendu par les membres du Conseil de Sécurité, a pris près de 12 mois pour être élaboré.

Dans son rapport, le Secrétaire-Général dresse un tableau de la situation au Sahel, les difficultés auxquelles se heurtent les Etats sur le plan sécuritaire, humanitaire et de développement ainsi que sur le plan de la gouvernance avant de présenter les différentes initiatives établies à ce jour, ainsi que l'action menée par l'Envoyé Spécial, M. Romano Prodi.

L'action de l'ONU au Sahel vise :

- à développer une approche globale dans la lutte contre l'extrémisme et la criminalité.
- à soutenir les pays de la région à combattre ces fléaux dans le cadre d'une approche régionale tout en veillant à une appropriation nationale de ce processus.
- à compléter les initiatives sous-régionales, notamment celles de l'Union Africaine, la CEDEAO, l'Union du Maghreb Arab (UMA) et le CENSAD.
- à promouvoir une coopération régionale effective entre les Etats du Sahel, notamment à travers les bons offices du Secrétaire-Général.
- à soutenir une approche régionale sur le plan de la sécurité, du développement, et l'intégration régionale.
- à accompagner les programmes nationaux, mis en place, pour adresser les questions humanitaires et développer leur résilience, sur le court, moyen et long terme.
- à veiller à une meilleure coordination de l'action onusienne sur le terrain.

La stratégie intégrée de l'ONU pour le Sahel repose sur les 3 objectifs suivants :

1. Développement d'une gouvernance effective et inclusive à travers la région par le biais des actions ci-après :

- Renforcement des institutions nationales pour promouvoir les pratiques démocratiques.
- Soutien à l'extension des services de l'Etat sur tout l'ensemble de leur territoire,

- Renforcement de la gouvernance locale.
- Soutien au renforcement des mécanismes régionaux de gouvernance.
- Renforcement des mécanismes nationaux et régionaux des droits de l'Homme afin de lutter contre l'impunité et la mise en place d'une justice nationale indépendante.
- Mise en place de mécanismes d'alertes précoces nationaux et régionaux.
- Promotion d'une gouvernance du secteur de sécurité à travers la mise en place d'institutions de justice et de sécurité responsable.

2. Des mécanismes nationaux et régionaux capables d'adresser les menaces transnationales, par le biais des actions ci-après:

- Renforcer les capacités onusiennes d'analyse et de monitoring des questions de sécurité régionale.
- Soutenir les Etats de la région à établir des mécanismes de coordination nationaux dans la lutte contre le terrorisme et du crime organisé. Un mécanisme de partage d'information entre les mécanismes de coordination des Etats de la région sera développé.
- Renforcer les capacités nationales pour une meilleure gestion de leurs frontières.
- Renforcer les capacités régionales dans la lutte contre le terrorisme et du crime transnational organisé.
- Promouvoir la coopération et inter-régionale entre les Etats du Sahel et du Maghreb à travers le développement d'une approche harmonisée visant à combattre les flux illicites et le mouvement des groupes armés, criminels et terroristes.
- Organiser sur la base des conclusions de la réunion organisée par le DECT à Rabat, sur la coopération entre les Etats du Sahel et du Maghreb dans le renforcement de la sécurisation des frontières, des rencontres annuelles (officiers des douanes, de police aux frontières et de renseignements) en vue de renforcer l'échange d'information et une coopération dans la sécurisation des frontières.
- Soutenir les efforts visant à promouvoir les échanges de renseignements entre les aéroports d'Amérique latine, d'Afrique de l'Ouest, du Sahel, du Maghreb et de l'Europe afin de combattre les trafics illicites.

3. Des mécanismes nationaux et régionaux capables d'adresser les menaces transnationales :

- Soutenir les gouvernements de la région dans le renforcement de la résilience des Etats.
- Harmoniser l'action humanitaire et de développement en faveur des pays du Sahel.

La mise en œuvre de cette stratégie sera assurée par le bureau régional des Nations Unies à Dakar (UNOWA). L'Envoyé Spécial du Secrétaire-Général pour le Sahel, M. Romano Prodi, pour sa part, continuera à mobiliser les ressources nécessaires pour le Sahel et à travailler avec les Institutions Financières Internationales ou régionales vers l'établissement d'un Fonds d'action pour le Sahel pour le développement des infrastructures régionales.

Commentaires :

- Le rapport du Secrétaire Général sur le Sahel et la stratégie intégrée de l'ONU pour le Sahel ont considérablement évolué depuis le premier projet que cette Mission s'est procurée en septembre 2012.
- Globalement, la stratégie onusienne pour le Sahel présente des pistes intéressantes, favorables aux intérêts de notre pays, vers le renforcement de l'action de l'ONU, de la coopération régionale et interrégionale et des capacités des Etats concernés.
- Il y a lieu de signaler que les préoccupations du Maroc ont été prises en compte par le Secrétariat, lors de la finalisation de la stratégie. Sur ce dernier point, la stratégie fait explicitement référence aux conclusions de la réunion de Rabat, et non de Nouakchott (UA), dans le cadre du renforcement de la coopération interrégionale entre les Etats du Maghreb et du Sahel à travers la tenue d'une réunion annuelle. La stratégie se réfère à la réunion organisée à Nouakchott seulement dans le cadre du renforcement des capacités régionales (CEDEAO et UA/CAERT et APSA).
- Il est important de noter que malgré le "forcing" de l'Ambassadeur de l'Algérie au niveau du Département des Affaires Politiques (DPA) pour influencer le contenu du rapport, la visibilité de l'Algérie et de ses initiatives ont été considérablement limitées. En effet, les références au Comité d'Etat Majeur Opérationnel Conjoint (CEMOC) ont été supprimées de cette version finale de la stratégie et le CEMOC et l'Unité de Fusion de Liaison (UFL) ne sont cités qu'en temps qu'initiatives prises par 4 pays de la région dans le rapport du SG.
- Le Maroc, pour sa part, entend présenter une Déclaration Présidentielle pour endosser la stratégie onusienne sur le Sahel, encourager la coordination au niveau de l'ONU, clarifier les modalités de mise en œuvre de la stratégie et le rôle de l'Envoyé Spécial Prodi tout en appelant au renforcement de la coopération interrégionale.
- En ce qui concerne la mise en œuvre de la stratégie, il y a lieu d'indiquer que le Bureau régional de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (UNOWA) sera chargé de cette tâche. M. Prodi, pour sa part, veillera à la mobilisation des ressources et des fonds pour les initiatives en faveur du Sahel et la coordination des Institutions financières internationales et régionales.

Haute Considération,

L. Bouchaara
Lotfi BOUCHAARA
Représentant Permanent Adjoint



Attached is an advance copy of the **Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sahel region** for the information of the members of the Security Council.

This report will be issued as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/2013/354.

14 June 2013

**Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the
Sahel region**

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2056 (2012), in which the Council requested me to develop and implement, in consultation with regional organizations, a United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel region encompassing security, governance, development, human rights and humanitarian issues. It is also pursuant to resolution 2071 (2012) in which the Council welcomed the appointment of my Special Envoy for the Sahel to mobilize international efforts, formulate a United Nations integrated strategy on the Sahel and contribute to defining the parameters of a comprehensive solution to the Malian crisis. This report provides an update on the situation in the region, the activities of my Special Envoy for the Sahel, Mr. Romano Prodi, since his appointment in October 2012, and the formulation of the UN integrated strategy for the Sahel (annex 1), taking into account existing regional and international initiatives.

II. Background

2. For much of the last year, the world watched in horror as long-standing political grievances in Mali were overshadowed by appalling acts of violence carried out by insurgents linked to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). More than half a million people are estimated to

have fled and sought refuge either in Malian host communities or in neighbouring countries since the beginning of the Mali crisis in January 2012. Serious human rights violations committed by armed groups and Government soldiers, including summary executions and illegal arrests, recruitment and use of children, sexual violence against women and children, abductions of children and destruction and looting of property, are currently under investigation, while access to basic social services is limited, particularly in the north. In the regions of Timbuktu and Gao, 53 per cent of schools remain closed, while in the Kidal region, schools have not reopened at all.

3. Considerable efforts have been made by France, Chad, ECOWAS, the African Union (AU) and the Security Council to help the people of Mali stabilise their country. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MISNUSMA) will play a key role in consolidating these hard won gains. However, the problems in Mali should not be seen in isolation. While the deployment of peacekeepers is a critical component of the international response to the current crisis, the countries of the region recognize that sustainable peace and security will require collective action in addressing the root causes of instability that extend well beyond Mali's borders.

4. The "Sahel" stretches from Mauritania to Eritrea, including Mali, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Nigeria, and the Sudan, a belt dividing the Sahara Desert and the savannahs to the south. The historic trade routes across Mali, Mauritania, Algeria, Niger, Chad, Libya and

Burkina Faso are the most vulnerable to terrorist and criminal networks. The terrain is harsh and in the best of cases, extremely difficult to control. The Algeria-Mali border alone stretches 1,300 kilometers. Moreover, developments in the Sahel-Sahara region affect and are affected by developments in North and West Africa. It will therefore be necessary to remain flexible and inclusive, engaging Governments and the population in Sahelian states, as and when problems affect them.

Governance and security challenges

5. Countries in the Sahel have been dealing with successive political and humanitarian crises for years. Weak governance and its impact on state institutions, including insufficient border management, have dramatically diminished the capacity of the Sahelian states to effectively deliver basic services, promote broad-based political participation and protect human rights. Widespread corruption, coupled with the inability of states to deliver basic services such as effective policing, justice, access to water, affordable health care and education has resulted in a widening gap in state-society relations. At the same time, chronic political instability, evident in recurrent unconstitutional changes of government, violent electoral processes and social conflicts, is a direct result of lack of institutionalized political dialogue, weak parliaments and contested judicial systems.

6. The situation has left the Sahel countries increasingly vulnerable to insecurity resulting from armed conflict,

terrorist activities, illicit trafficking and related organized crime. I am particularly concerned by the apparent links between criminal syndicates involved in drug trafficking and related organized crime, as well as non-state armed groups active in the region. I am further alarmed by the activities of terrorist organizations and other militant groups, such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram and the Mouvement pour l'Unité du Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO) as well as other transnational criminal organizations. They have committed acts of terrorism and abuses of human rights, increased the widespread flow of arms, and engaged in human trafficking, drug trafficking and other illicit practices, while at the same time eroding state authority in many of the most vulnerable sections of society in the countries of the Sahel. In doing so they have restricted opportunities for development.

7. The double attack by MUJAO suicide bombers on a barracks and a French run uranium mine in Niger on 23 May killing 35 people and wounding dozens, demonstrates that the Sahel remains vulnerable to the scourge of terrorism. Compounding this challenge, terrorism also has the potential to infiltrate into the wider region as demonstrated by a serious hostage taking incident at a natural gas complex in Algeria on 19 January resulting in numerous deaths. The Government of Libya has repeatedly conveyed to SRSB Mitri its concerns over the threats posed by terrorists and organized criminal groups in the region, as well as to its own internal security. Like other countries in the region, Libya's borders are vast and porous, which makes effective patrolling extremely difficult.

8. In 2012, it was estimated that 18 tons of cocaine amounting to US\$ 1.25 billion transited through West Africa, a portion of which allegedly passing through the Sahel. Lack of economic opportunities, limited regional cooperation, weak security and defense sectors as well as porous national borders have also hampered efforts to counter the spread of illicit trafficking, organized crime and terrorism.

9. The issue of cross-border criminality - trafficking in drugs, persons, firearms and cigarettes, as well as terrorism, and money laundering - is often linked to persons or organizations located well beyond the Sahel, and even the African continent. I call on all the concerned Member States to do their part in preventing the use of their territory for criminal activities that exploit the Sahel's weak governance and contribute to the misery of the people of the region. I urge all Member States to do their utmost to tackle drug trafficking, both at its source and at its destination.

10. There is also a lack of government capacity to ensure the protection of basic human rights; both a root cause and a symptom of recurrent crises in the region. Human rights challenges arise from a combination of long-standing weaknesses in the rule of law, a general lack of accountability, social and gender inequities and repeated discriminatory practices against certain vulnerable groups, such as women, including less access than men to land, agricultural assets, inputs and services and to rural employment opportunities, as well as lack of participation

in political life. Conflicts and widespread instability have further worsened the human rights situation and are drivers of forced displacement in the Sahel region. The Malian crisis is the latest example of large-scale refugee movements, with nearly 200,000 refugees in neighboring countries, adding pressure on host communities and the environment.

Development and Humanitarian Challenges

11. The Sahel is confronted with acute development and humanitarian challenges. Human development in the region is among the lowest in the world. Over the years, recurring food and nutritional crises caused by climate change, environmental degradation, drought, floods, poorly functioning markets, low agricultural productivity, poverty, and conflict have seriously eroded the ability of households to withstand repeated and increasingly frequent shocks. Despite good rains and better harvests in 2012, at least 11.4 million people in the Sahel region remain food insecure. About 5 million children under the age of five are at risk of acute malnutrition, of which about 1.5 million are at risk of severe acute malnutrition (SAM). The prices of cereal, the staple food in the Sahel, have been increasing since October 2010 and are above the last five year average leading to a significant decrease in the purchasing power of vulnerable households. In addition, the Sahel region faces major and recurrent outbreaks of infectious diseases, such as meningitis, polio and cholera, which present major challenges for weak health systems and can only be addressed through a long-term regional approach aimed at building resilience.

12. Despite its marginal productivity, the Sahel supports nearly 150 million people. At current growth rates, its population is likely to balloon in the next twenty-five years to nearly a quarter of a billion people. Agriculture and pastoralism sustain the major portion of the population in the Sahel. However, traditional livelihoods alone will evidently not be sufficient and a significant transformation will be required across the region. The convergence of chronic under-investment in the agricultural and energy sectors, ineffective social protection systems, inequitable access to basic social services, such as nutrition, education, health, water and sanitation, environmental degradation and rapid population growth, will only result in a further deepening of vulnerability without sustained investment and cooperation in these areas.

13. The regional climate trends observed over the last 40 years in the Sahel show that the impact of changing climatic conditions on the availability of natural resources (land and water), coupled with other magnifying factors, have led to increased competition over natural resources and tensions between communities. While migration and the movement of people and livestock are an integral part of the Sahel's ancestral livelihood strategies, they also occur as a result of multiple climate and market shocks.

14. In particular, many families and communities do not have the capacity to safely and appropriately withstand the damaging effects of climate, poor agro-pastoral campaigns, market fluctuations and other socio-economic shocks they

are facing. Conflict further exacerbates existing vulnerabilities. The adoption of negative coping mechanisms, such as selling valuable assets, including agricultural inputs and livestock, incurring debt, migrating to urban areas, pulling children out of school and reducing the quantity and nutritional quality of purchased food leads to a vicious downward spiral of diminished coping capacity, hunger, poverty, and destitution. Poverty and destitution are also among the underlying reasons why children from the region are associated with armed groups, as demonstrated by reports of cross-border recruitment of children from Burkina Faso and Niger by armed groups operating in Mali.

Way forward

15. Despite the daunting multi-faceted challenges facing the Sahel, the unity now demonstrated over Mali gives me confidence that the political will exists both regionally and internationally to address the inter-related root causes of the crisis in the region. We must take advantage of the international consensus, which was evident during the High-Level meeting on the Sahel that I chaired in the margins of General Assembly general debate on 26 September 2012. Working with the Governments of the region, our objective should be to bring about long-term change through a comprehensive strategy, taking into account existing efforts. This approach needs to be firmly anchored in strong resilience-building efforts as part of a long-term development agenda for the region.

III. Existing national, regional and international initiatives to address Sahel challenges

16. Over the years, the countries of the Sahel region have initiated a series of national reforms aimed at addressing chronic governance, security, development and humanitarian challenges faced, although the scale of these challenges varies from country to country. Flagship programmes have been launched in a number of countries in support of these efforts. For example, in 2012 the Government of Niger launched the "*Strategie de Developpement et de Securite dans les zones Sahelo-Sahariennes du Niger*". In 2011 it also launched the widely known initiative 3N, 'les Nigériens nourrissent les Nigériens' on food security and nutrition. The Mauritanian government has been at the forefront of efforts to promote enhanced regional border management and, in this regard, hosted an AU Ministerial conference on security cooperation in the Sahelo-Saharan region on 17 March 2013. The Government of Mauritania has also developed a food security strategy, a social protection strategy, a joint programme on nutrition and a Millennium Development Goal (MDG) Acceleration Framework on maternal health. The Government of Burkina Faso is leading ECOWAS mediation efforts in Mali, while on the domestic front it has put in place a plan of action to address long term food insecurity. The Government of Chad has committed to raising USD 400 million from 2012 to 2015 for rural sector transformation to build the foundation for sustained food security and in January 2013 provided a significant and timely contribution to peacekeeping efforts in Mali.

Following an end to major hostilities, the interim Government of Mali has, for its part, developed and launched a comprehensive plan for sustainable recovery for 2013 and 2014. The plan includes pillars on infrastructure, basic social services, food security and governance and decentralization.

17. At the sub-regional and regional levels, the AU and ECOWAS have developed comprehensive regional frameworks to promote development, good governance, and peace and security and in the region. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is an AU strategic framework for pan-African socio-economic development, with several programs in the areas of integration and infrastructure, agriculture and food security, as well as climate change and national resource management. Other important frameworks include the 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, the 2011 Praia Declaration on Elections and Stability in West Africa and the ECOWAS Humanitarian Policy and Plan of Action (2012-17), as well as the 2008-2011 ECOWAS Political Declaration and Regional Action Plan to Combat Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime and Drug Abuse, which was extended until the end of 2013 during the 42nd Ordinary Session of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government in February 2013 in Côte d'Ivoire.

During the same Session, the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government also adopted the Political Declaration on a Common Position against Terrorism, which includes a Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan.

18. In addition to the progress at the regional level in the Sahel, inter-regional cooperation with West Africa and the Maghreb requires greater attention, as many of the challenges faced, including environmental degradation, terrorism and organized crime are inter-regional in nature. The AU, for its part, is supporting the implementation of the 2013-2018 Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention. Through the African Centre for Research and Studies on Terrorism (ACRST) in Algiers, the AU supports member states in implementing its counterterrorism legal framework through regional and international information sharing, cooperation and coordination. In addition, a group of four countries of the Sahel (Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) have established two mechanisms aimed at addressing transnational threats and enhancing intelligence cooperation - the Common Operational Joint-Chiefs of Staff Committee (CEMOC) located in Tamanrasset, Algeria, and the Unified Fusion and Liaison (UFL) cell. However, those mechanisms need to become fully operational. In addition, the Permanent Inter State Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) has an important role to play in monitoring and analyzing agriculture production and food prices in the region, while the Conference of the Community of Sahelo-Saharan states (CEN-SAD) is ready and needs support to take more action, as demonstrated during its last meeting in March 2013.

19. At the international level, the European Union (EU) launched its Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel in March 2012. The strategy seeks to address the root causes of poverty in the region and create conditions for economic and human development. The EU-led Global Alliance

for Resilience Initiative (AGIR) was officially launched on 6 December 2012 to address the causes of food insecurity in the region. On 18 March 2013, the EU appointed a Special Representative for the Sahel to lead the EU's contribution to regional and international efforts to foster lasting peace, security and development in the Sahel. The EU also authorized an assistance mission to reinforce efforts to help Libya manage its borders more effectively. A number of other actors have also appointed Special Envoys for the Sahel, including the AU, the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and a range of bi-lateral actors.

20. In 2007, the United States Government launched the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) aimed at enhancing the capacity of countries in the Sahel region to tackle terrorism. It also seeks to facilitate cooperation between Sahel countries and Maghreb partners, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, on counter-terrorism issues. Within the framework of the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF), Algeria and Canada co-chair the Sahel Working Group on Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building. International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have been providing direct financial assistance to the countries and have funded infrastructure development projects across the region. The World Bank is in the process of drafting a development strategy for Mali and the wider Sahel sub-region, while the African Development Bank is working on its Sahel Initiative. In addition, non-governmental organizations have been instrumental in developing policies, supporting advocacy efforts and implementing related initiatives, with a focus on the community level.

21. Following the influx of returnees to the region from Libya and the resumption of armed conflict in northern Mali, the Security Council convened a series of meetings and issued resolutions 2056 (2012), 2071 (2012) and 2085 (2012) as well as a Presidential Statement on 10 December 2012 in order to effectively address the interrelated challenges facing the Sahel region. In April 2012, I appointed a Regional Humanitarian Coordinator to develop and coordinate humanitarian response in the region. In October 2012, I appointed Romano Prodi as my Special Envoy for the Sahel to lead the United Nations in its efforts to develop and implement an integrated strategy for the region. The United Nations also convened, in collaboration with Member States, a series of meetings on border management, including a meeting on border control cooperation in the Sahel and the Maghreb hosted by the Kingdom of Morocco in March 2013. Meanwhile, the United Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) continues to advise the Libyan authorities on matters relating to border security, and the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA), the United Nations Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), as well as other United Nations missions in the wider region, continue to work on these issues.

22. On the ground, United Nations Country Teams have been active in providing support to the countries in the Sahel region, in particular through the development and implementation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) or other National Development Frameworks (Accelerated Growth and Sustainable Development Strategy, etc.), country-specific United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAFs), Consolidated Appeal Process (CAPs) and

MDG Acceleration Frameworks (MAFs) to support the range of humanitarian and development concerns facing the region.

IV. Rationale for a regional approach and United Nations principles of engagement in the Sahel

23. Based on the foregoing analysis of the underlying causes of instability, and taking into account efforts taken to date to address them, the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel, outlined in annex I of the present report, aims to support the Governments and people of the region in their efforts to address the causes of instability within a sustainable and long-term perspective. In particular, the United Nations strategy identifies specific objectives and actions under three overarching goals, namely, (a) enhancing inclusive and effective governance throughout the region; (b) strengthening the capacity of national and regional security mechanisms to address cross-border threats; and (c) integrating development and humanitarian interventions to build resilience.

24. The Political will of governments in the region will be required to achieve the objectives and sustain the actions outlined in the United Nations integrated strategy, while ensuring coherence and complementarity with other initiatives. Acting through My Special Envoy for the Sahel and my Special Representatives for West and Central Africa, I will continue to use my good office to foster the necessary political will and mobilize resources, building on the efforts of the United Nations Country Teams.

25. The multiple national security, governance, development and human rights challenges facing the countries of the Sahel have regional ramifications. Inequitable political participation and access to social services have regional dimensions given the cross-border ties of marginalized groups. Terrorist and criminal groups act on a national, regional and international level. The environmental and economic shocks that give rise to humanitarian crises are also regional and international in nature.

26. The challenges facing the Sahel do not respect borders and neither can the solutions. Maintaining the focus on regional cooperation, national capacity building and information sharing will be particularly important. Ensuring proper information flow, coordination and complementarity has proven to be a major challenge for the initiatives taken to date at the regional level. A number of worthy initiatives have suffered from inadequate coordination and have failed to take into account the broader regional dimensions of the problem, partly due to lack of trust, lack of effective regional instruments or lack of information.

27. The governments and peoples of the region must be in the driver's seat. However, the United Nations, acting through my Special Envoy for the Sahel and my Special Representatives for West and Central Africa, will also do its part to improve coordination among the following sets of actors: i) Governments of the region; ii) the international community, including International Financial

Institutions (IFIs); iii) the people of the region, by reaching out to them through existing United Nations consultation mechanisms with civil society; and iv) the various parts of the United Nations system. Bringing together these four spheres of coordination, the United Nations system will help integrate efforts to address issues related to governance, security, and resilience, which constitute the three overarching goals of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel.

28. Fostering coordination between the Governments of the region is a top priority. Continuing to build trust and confidence among the countries of the Sahel will be a crosscutting objective of the United Nations integrated strategy, which aims to improve governance structures in the region in a manner that legitimately elected Governments are able to sustain and build upon, with as little dependency as possible on international assistance.

29. Coordination within the broader international community will be important to make optimal use of the limited resources available in the current global economic climate. In this regard, collaboration with regional organizations, in particular ECOWAS, CEN-SAD, the AU, the EU, as well as International Financial Institutions, bilateral donors and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) will be important to generate, sustain and coordinate international engagement in support of the national efforts of Sahelian countries to address the multifaceted challenges they face.

30. The people of the region must be heard and made part of any solution affecting their lives. Consultations with the

people of the region will be based on existing United Nations mechanisms and will include civil society, tribal and religious leaders, representatives of academia, think tanks, and women and youth, with particular attention to the marginalized.

31. The United Nations integrated strategy is designed to foster system-wide unity of purpose and provide a basis for coherent United Nations engagement in the Sahel. It envisages a range of innovative actions related to, inter alia, the enhancement of regional security analysis and regional capacity to manage borders, the strengthening of local government and state capacity to distribute resources more equitably, the provision of support to vulnerable households and the enhancement of food and nutritional security.

32. The United Nations integrated strategy seeks to enable a multi-sectoral approach to the problems of the Sahel and ensure that the design and implementation of actions bring together the strengths and capacities of the various parts of the United Nations system. It also seeks to build, strengthen and further integrate national capacity-building initiatives into wider development and security efforts, taking into account the policies, priorities and needs of each of the countries in the Sahel. Moreover, the integrated nature of the strategy means that it will be based on joint analysis of cross-cutting issues throughout the Sahel, drawing on inputs and data from all the countries of the region. The integrated strategy is designed to facilitate the prioritization and sequencing of efforts, so that achievements in a given area reinforce

implementation in other areas. It also allows for common reporting and analysis on how each area of action impacts upon the others. An integrated approach will also facilitate the development of common messaging and advocacy.

33. The following principles will guide the engagement of the United Nations in the Sahel:

- Focus on regional-level interventions and cross-border issues and threats, allowing for coherence and coordination amongst short-, medium- and long-term measures;
- Anchor regional United Nations engagement in national ownership and accountability and ensure it is grounded in international human rights standards and principles;
- Promote the integration of regional priorities into national planning and programming to ensure coherence and mutually reinforcing action across the region;
- Promote an equitable approach to development in order to accelerate achievement of MDGs and support social cohesion and conflict prevention;
- Maximize the impact of the United Nations system in addressing the Sahel region's ongoing challenges and focus on areas where the United Nations has or can have added value to address crises, while building on existing initiatives and ongoing efforts;
- Ensure free, active and meaningful participation of people and communities at risk throughout all programming

phases, including needs assessments, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of programmes;

- Promote cooperation and coordination amongst national, regional, sub-regional and international partners, while strengthening partnerships with regional and sub-regional institutions and stakeholders within their respective mandates and reaching out to new potential partners;
- Ensure that gender concerns are included in all regional and national efforts targeting the Sahel, including through free, active and meaningful participation of women and their organizations in decision-making;
- Encourage South-South cooperation and sharing of best practices amongst the countries of the Sahel.

V. Activities of the Special Envoy

34. Since his appointment, my Special Envoy has started to foster the close coordination we need. He has undertaken considerable consultations with key actors working in or on the Sahel region. He has visited the region on several occasions, along with my Special Representative for West Africa, and has met with heads of state, government officials and civil society actors in Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, as well as the ECOWAS President in Côte d'Ivoire. He has held consultations with the AU, its High Representative for Mali and the Sahel, and the ECOWAS Commission. He also visited Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia.

35. My Special Envoy has put a strong emphasis on the need for regional development in the Sahel and to this end has

visited a number of key international partners, including China, France, Germany, Japan, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, the United States, the European Union, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation and United Nations Agencies, Funds and Programmes, and has maintained close contact with them. On 7 December 2012, he convened the first ever coordination meeting with Special Envoys and mediators for the Sahel region. He engaged regularly with the SRSG for West Africa, the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for the Sahel, Resident Coordinators and United Nations Country Teams in the region.

36. During his visits to the region, my Special Envoy has held meetings with civil society representatives and women. In April 2013, together with the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission and the Acting Head of UN Women, my Special Envoy hosted a conference on Women in the Sahel, looking at issues involving women as economic and political drivers of change, as well as their role in conflict mediation. He will continue these consultations with the support of the respective Governments of the region, with the aim of facilitating more inclusive governance processes.

37. On 1 March, my Special Envoy co-hosted with my Special Advisor on MDGs a seminar in Dakar, bringing together local academics, experts, and representatives of United Nations agencies and International Financial Institutions to

discuss and identify innovative approaches to fundamental development issues facing the region.

38. The United Nations, European Union, World Bank, African Development Bank, Islamic Development Bank and bilateral donors have all developed strategies to support peace and development in the Sahel. Key partners have encouraged my Special Envoy to support the establishment of a mechanism to enhance coordination among these actors, prioritize actions, and mobilize resources, particularly for key regional infrastructure projects that can kick-start growth quickly and effectively, drive regional integration and create employment, especially for youth. To maximize the impact of our collective efforts in this area, I propose that emphasis be placed on the core Sahelian countries of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.

39. Based on the elements outlined above, My Special Envoy's proposal for a Sahel-owned Development Plan would include two platforms: a coordination platform and an action fund. The coordination platform would focus mainly on regularly updating regional infrastructure priorities, identified through a bottom-up process involving local academics and experts and coordinated by my Special Envoy, in key areas such as agriculture, water management, integrated infrastructure including telecommunications, solar energy and health and education. The platform would enable the main multilateral donors to meet every six months to review their strategies, ensure needs are met and avoid overlap. They would meet with the countries concerned to discuss and agree on priorities for resource mobilization. The inaugural meeting of the coordination

platform could take place on the margins of the General Assembly in September 2013.

40. The funding platform would act as a “clearing house” for the identified regional infrastructure priorities so as to effectively match needs with available resources. Donors would be encouraged to provide support, either financially or in-kind, for agreed and vetted regional priorities, which would be updated regularly by the above-mentioned coordination platform. In order to facilitate the necessary resource mobilization, my Special Envoy proposes the establishment of a Sahel Action Fund, which could be managed by a pool of International Financial Institutions. The fund would aim to attract bi-lateral and multi-lateral financial support, while also tracking in-kind contributions and encouraging contributors to align their support with the identified regional infrastructure priorities.

41. In keeping with the principle of national ownership, countries in the region will be asked to identify and detail their regional infrastructure priorities. To this end, on 14 June, my Special Envoy convened a follow-up meeting of academics from the Sahel in Bologna, Italy. This meeting constitutes the first step in a process that would allow regional infrastructure priorities to be further developed and refined. Based on the results of the Bologna meeting, my Special Envoy intends to convene the Finance and Planning Ministers of the Sahel region to review and validate the identified regional infrastructure priorities. To support this bottom-up planning process, my Special Envoy proposes that a small, specialized regional ‘Sahel

Development Research Institute' be established with financing from the Action Fund.

42. In order to encourage resource mobilization, my Special Envoy will convene another meeting of Special Envoys for the Sahel to consider the regional infrastructure prioritizes validated by Ministers from the region. In addition, my Special Envoy will continue his discussions with the leadership of the African Development Bank to explore whether, with support from the World Bank, it could lead a pool of International Development Institutions, including the Islamic Development Bank and the European Investment Bank, to manage the proposed Sahel Action Fund.

VI. Observations and recommendations

43. The security environment in the Sahel remains fragile. The threat of terrorism, trafficking and organized crime require a comprehensive response. Our collective focus needs to be simultaneously on security, diplomacy and development, taking sub-regional and regional threats and opportunities into consideration, including relations with West Africa and the Maghreb. Business as usual is not an option.

44. Given the situation in Mali and the implications for the Sahel region, we must target the needs of future generations while more urgently dealing with the pressing needs of the present one. We must promote political and economic inclusion of marginalized groups, particularly in the border areas. We must develop a comprehensive approach

against extremism and criminality, in line with international human rights norms and standards, focused on providing opportunities for youth and other risk groups such as prisoners, giving a voice to women and fighting corruption.

45. Past initiatives aimed at resolving crises and conflict in the Sahel have focused largely on the national level and shown their limits given the cross-border nature and regional scope of the complex challenges confronting the region. Going forward, the United Nations will need to link national efforts and initiatives to region-wide approaches more effectively. The United Nations integrated strategy is intended to guide United Nations efforts to collectively support Sahel countries address those challenges from a regional perspective, while adhering to the principle of national ownership. The approach is premised on the integration of humanitarian, development and security interventions in order to ensure that life-saving activities meet immediate needs, while building the resilience of people and communities as part of a long-term development agenda for the region.

46. The United Nations integrated strategy builds on existing analyses and recommendations, including the United Nations interagency assessment mission to the Sahel with the participation of the AU, in December 2011, the conclusions of the AU and United Nations Experts' meeting on the Sahel region, held in Addis Ababa from 14 to 15 March 2012 (endorsed by the Ministerial-level AU Peace and Security Council meeting on 20 March 2012 in Bamako), and

the United Nations Action Plan for Resilience-building in the Sahel. It is geared towards complementing initiatives and measures taken by the States of the Sahel, West Africa and the Maghreb, as well as regional entities, including the AU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), and the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CENSAD). The proposed strategy is a living document that will be continuously modified, adapted and adjusted as its implementation progresses and the circumstances on the ground evolve.

47. In implementing the integrated strategy for the Sahel, the United Nations will seek to leverage its comparative advantage based on its long-standing presence in the region and its experience in addressing some of the most acute problems facing the populations concerned. The Organization will draw upon its good offices function to coordinate, facilitate and convene relevant actors to help tackle some of the critical issues as well as support resource mobilization and advocacy efforts. However, the UN alone cannot successfully address the tremendous challenges facing the Sahel, and the countries of the region have to maintain their leadership and ownership of the process. The effectiveness of the strategy must be enhanced through partnerships with other interested major actors in the region, such as the AU and ECOWAS, International Financial Institutions, and multilateral and bilateral partners, whose technical and financial assistance will be key to the success of this coordinated approach.

48. Effective regional cooperation among Sahelian countries requires continued engagement. I will continue to use my

good offices, including through my Special Envoy for the Sahel and my Special Representatives for West and Central Africa, to help build mutual trust among states in the Sahel.

49. Nowhere is the development-security nexus more evident than in the Sahel. Only through strong, common preventative actions geared primarily towards development can we avoid the Sahel turning into an area dominated by criminal and terrorist groups that undermine our collective security. Regional security, regional development cooperation and greater regional integration are essential and should go hand-in-hand with one another. We must therefore focus on strengthening regional mechanisms across all sectors and promote integrated and comprehensive national strategies for dealing with terrorism and transnational organized crime that complement these mechanisms. For this reason, the United Nations' strategy will be implemented in close cooperation with the AU, ECOWAS, ECCAS, CEN-SAD, CILSS, the Arab-Maghreb Union and other relevant sub-regional actors.

50. Building upon national programs already in place in a number of countries, actions are urgently needed to support inclusive resilience building. In the short-term, humanitarian action will continue to provide life-saving assistance and address most acute needs. In the medium-term, and through a mixture of humanitarian and development assistance, disaster risk reduction and development interventions will aim to rebuild assets, support livelihoods, scale up social protection, and provide access to basic services, without any form of discrimination. In

the long-term, it will be important to consolidate the gains achieved through short and medium-term interventions to achieve peace, sustainable growth, and human development. In this respect, resilience is also about preventative action.

51. The United Nations strategy needs to be bottom-up and participatory, with clear government leadership, ownership and accountability, including through the allocation of funds. It must ensure that short, medium, and long-term efforts are captured in integrated, multi-year programming of humanitarian and development assistance so as to respond to immediate needs and reinforce the capacities, livelihoods and opportunities of the most vulnerable people in the long run. Evaluation of the risks to which a community or country may be exposed is also necessary.

52. The implementation of the United Nations Strategy will require the sustained engagement of the United Nations System as a whole over a period of years. In order to maximize its impact on the ground, its implementation should rest on the strong engagement of UNOWA and the United Nations system in the region. Over time, it should result in a regionally-owned implementation mechanism. The strategy must also be reviewed and refined on a continuous basis, through consultation and cooperation with the countries of the region and the international community.

53. In order to deliver on this ambitious agenda, the United Nations will undertake a review of the resources at the global, regional and country levels currently being

marshaled in support of the Sahel to determine how best to focus its support. The Regional United Nations Development Group (UNDG) Team in Dakar, Senegal will be further capacitated to pursue this agenda for the region. Building on existing efforts, the UN Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs) for the region will be used as the instrument to advance this strategy at the country level. Regional capacities on early warning across the Sahel will be strengthened under the lead role of the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA), with the support of all UN entities involved in the implementation of the strategy.

54. The implementation of agreed regional infrastructure priorities will be key to driving human and economic development and will directly complement the roll-out of the United Nations integrated strategy. To this end, the proposed establishment of a coordination platform will help ensure that the efforts of the international community are aligned with the regional needs identified through a bottom-up process. This will help ensure that a coherent and coordinated approach is pursued in the spirit of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. My Special Envoy will continue to engage with the International Financial Institutions, particularly the World Bank and the African Development Bank to explore the possibility of establishing a Sahel Action Fund for Regional Infrastructure capable of tracking and channeling both financial and in-kind contributions.

55. I should like to express my appreciation to my Special Envoy for the Sahel, Mr. Romano Prodi, and his staff for

their efforts to contribute to sustainable peace and development of the Sahel region. I would also like to note the efforts of the United Nations Offices throughout the Sahel region for their continued commitment.

Annex I: UN INTEGRATED STRATEGY FOR THE SAHEL

The UN integrated strategy is built around three broad areas of support formulated as strategic goals and organized according to key themes. The strategic goals are intended to support and strengthen ongoing initiatives and to address previously-identified gaps. A series of specific objectives and indicative actions are proposed to achieve these goals. The three areas of support are complementary and form an integrated response to the Sahel crisis. In particular, the approach is premised on the integration of humanitarian and development interventions to ensure that life-saving activities meet immediate needs while building the resilience of people and communities as part of a long-term development agenda.

STRATEGIC GOAL ONE: INCLUSIVE AND EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE THROUGHOUT THE REGION IS ENHANCED

Effective governance rests on State legitimacy based on political inclusion, rule of law as well as State capacity and accountability to deliver basic services. The United Nations' good offices are focused in part on helping countries of the region attain state legitimacy when and where required, and the programmatic activities of the system are geared towards building the needed capacity and accountability mechanisms. Good governance including in the security sector, is an essential element of United Nations programming, as reflected in the UNDAFs and PRSPs or national development frameworks. The goal of effective and inclusive governance can be broken down into the following objectives and indicative actions:

Objective 1.1: Strengthen institutions to foster democratic practices including political dialogue, free, fair and transparent elections, and broad-based participation.

Indicative actions:

- (i) Support programmes aimed at empowering political parties in Sahelian countries to promote peaceful politics and women's political participation including through the establishment of inclusive inter-party dialogue frameworks. (DPA, UNDP UNWOMEN)
- (ii) Promote the exchange of knowledge and experiences sharing between Electoral Management Bodies in the Sahel region on issues pertaining to the prevention of election-related conflicts, including Gender-based Violence (GBV). (DPA, UNDP, UNWOMEN)
- (iii) Support the establishment of national early warning mechanisms to prevent, respond to and mitigate potential conflict throughout the electoral process. (DPA, UNDP)

- (iv) Foster the active, meaningful and free participation of civil society organizations including youth, women and minority groups and the media, in the political life of the respective countries. (UNDP, UNWOMEN)
- (v) Support the development of programmes aimed at building the capacity and oversight functions of parliaments, with a focus on more effective oversight, and enhanced capacity for parliamentary committees. (UNDP)
- (vi) Promote greater participation of women from the Sahel region in all international fora and peace talks to resolve the crises in the Sahel, building on the High-Level EU/United Nations Conference on Women's Leadership in the Sahel region, which was held on 9 April 2013, as well as other relevant international and regional frameworks. (UNWOMEN, DPA)
- (vii) Build the capacity of governmental and non-governmental national and regional actors, including Regional Economic Communities, (RECs) on issues related to facilitation, dialogue and mediation to foster peace and reconciliation, manage political risks and promote collaborative processes. (DPA, UNDP, UNWOMEN)

Objective 1.2: Support local governance and the extension of government services throughout national territories.

Indicative actions:

- (i) Promote and support the drafting and implementation of legislation on decentralisation and deconcentration in Sahel countries. (UNDP)
- (ii) Build the capacity of and accountability mechanisms within national and local institutions to deliver quality basic social services, including health, education, water and sanitation, promote equitable access and the need to enhance resilience at the local level. (UNICEF, WHO, UNFPA)
- (iii) Build the capacity of local authorities and institutions to establish and implement mechanisms for broader and more inclusive participation of the community and vulnerable groups, including women, in local development. (UNDP, UNICEF, UNWOMEN)

Objective 1.3: Strengthen state capacities to ensure more equitable access to resources and socioeconomic services.

Indicative actions:

- (i) Support the development and enhancement of policies and practices aimed at improving public sector resource management allocation and accountability, including independent oversight. (UNDP)
- (ii) Strengthen the capacity of governments and other relevant stakeholders to harness natural resources to advance human development in four inter-dependent areas: participatory legislation, policy and planning; people-centered exploration; effective revenue collection and management; and investment in human development and structural transformation. (UNDP)

Objective 1.4: Help Sahel countries strengthen regional mechanisms for economic governance.

Indicative actions:

- (i) Develop the capacities of RECs and support their regional action plans to ensure ownership among countries in the implementation of public finance reforms, and reinforce results-based management and accelerated regional integration. (UNDP, ECA)
- (ii) Support the implementation at the regional level of the United Nations Convention against Corruption. (UNCAC, UNODC)

Objective 1.5: Strengthen national and regional human rights mechanisms to fight impunity and help Sahel countries strengthen independent national justice systems to effectively address corruption.

Indicative actions:

- (i) Promote the ratification and implementation of international and regional human rights instruments, as well as the use of regional human rights mechanisms, such as the AU Court on Human and Peoples' rights or ECOWAS Community Court of Justice. (OHCHR)
- (ii) Establish a regional platform to share experiences, discuss common challenges and define common regional priorities of parliamentary committees in the Sahel region. (UNDP, UNOWA)
- (iii) Support the establishment of national human rights institutions (NHRIs) in conformity with international standards, and help establish a Network of NHRIs for the Sahel region. (OHCHR)
- (iv) Help design and support truth-seeking processes, national consultations on transitional justice, judicial accountability mechanisms, and reparation

programmes, including victims of sexual violence, and provide advice on relevant institutional reforms. (OHCHR, DPKO, UNDP)

- (v) Help the countries of the region put in place appropriate anti-corruption legislation and action plans in accordance with international and regional conventions (the UNCAC, AU Convention Against Corruption and ECOWAS Protocol); and strengthen the capacity and functioning of National Anti-Corruption Commissions to better prevent, detect and fight corruption. (UNDP, UNODC)
- (vi) Support the strengthening of internal and external oversight, as well as integrity safeguard mechanisms, for law enforcement and justice personnel. (UNODC)

Objective 1.6: Support community security and social cohesion.

Indicative actions:

- (i) Support the development of a community security and social cohesion strategy through participatory and inclusive dialogue for Sahel countries. (UNDP, UNOWA, UNODC)
- (ii) Enhance community security, social cohesion and justice service provision at local level, including police stations, courts, legal aid and correction facilities for easy access to responsive accountable and effective security and justice services. (DPKO, UNDP, UNWOMEN)

Objective 1.7: Assist Sahel countries in the development of national and regional early warning systems to address potential governance challenges and security threats.

Indicative actions:

- (i) Support Governments, ECOWAS and other regional entities in the enhancement of existing early warning mechanisms, such as ECOWARN, the promotion linkages between them and the strengthening of their analytical capacities. (UNOWA, UNDP)
- (ii) Promote regional dialogue among traditional and community leaders, and leaders of faith-based organizations to address, among other issues, recruitment by extremist groups as well as community-based conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms. (DPA, CTED)

- (iii) Support increased participation of youth, women and gender experts in peace talks, negotiations of peace agreements and efforts at national reconciliation. (UNOWA, UNDP, UNWOMEN)

Objective 1.8: Fostering sustainable security sector governance in the countries of the Sahel through the promotion of and support to professional, accountable and regulated security and justice institutions.

Indicative actions:

- (i) Build the capacity of national and regional institutions to enhance security sector governance in the Sahel by supporting: (a) the creation of a coordinating framework to link national, regional and international efforts in the area of security sector reform (SSR); (b) existing national initiatives on SSR and especially defence sector reform (DSR) through the provision of strategic and technical assistance. (UNOWA, DPKO)
- (ii) Enhance and expand the activities of existing joint sub-regional fora to facilitate the exchange of lessons, best practices and information on security and defence governance matters in West Africa, including by supporting ECOWAS efforts to finalize and implement its sub-regional security sector governance policy framework and action plan. (UNOWA, DPKO)

STRATEGIC GOAL TWO: NATIONAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY MECHANISMS ARE CAPABLE OF ADDRESSING CROSS-BORDER THREATS

National, sub-regional and regional security mechanisms, grounded in respect for human rights and the rule of law, need to be strengthened and made fully operational. The countries of the region, in response to the crisis in Mali, have taken initial steps towards greater cooperation, including in information sharing. The AU, United Nations, ECOWAS and CEN-SAD have played important roles in this area. It is important to build upon these efforts, both to foster trust among the countries whose cooperation is vital, and to strengthen their capacities to address cross-border threats. United Nations entities such as UNOWA, UNODC, CTIFT, DPKO, CTED, the 1267 Monitoring Team and OHCHR undertake important initiatives in these areas. It is crucial for the United Nations family to align its various initiatives when it comes to addressing the current Sahel crisis in a comprehensive and integrated manner, ensuring that these are grounded in respect for human rights and the rule of law, including illicit trafficking, transnational organised crime and terrorism, which do not always have the visibility they deserve in light of the critical situation in these areas in the region. Key objectives and indicative actions include the following:

Objective 2.1: Enhance United Nations regional security analysis and monitoring of cross-border threats in the Sahel.

Indicative actions:

- (i) Building upon existing mapping of security measures and mechanisms, including the United Nations Interagency Assessment report on the Sahel (S/2012/42) as well as detailed mapping exercises that have already been undertaken by CTITF, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) and CTED, the United Nations system will collaboratively identify gaps in existing frameworks aimed at combating transnational organized crime and terrorism. The United Nations system will step up its efforts to raise national stakeholders' awareness of the available strategies and technologies, with a view to making optimum use of resources. (CTITF, UNODC, UNOWA)
- (ii) In fulfillment of its preventive diplomacy mandate, UNOWA will work with the rest of the United Nations system to strengthen its analytical capacity and improve information sharing across the United Nations system in the sub-region. As part of this effort, a MINUSMA Liaison Officer, based in UNOWA, will collaborate with DSS analysts in the region, the 1267 Monitoring Team and other relevant United Nations actors, such as the Peace and Development Advisors (PDA), in support of UNOWA's analytical capacity. (UNOWA, DPKO, DSS)

Objective 2.2: Enhance national capacities, including through improved coordination between relevant national institutions, to tackle terrorism and transnational organized crime in line with international human rights standards.

Indicative actions:

- (i) An important step towards more effective border management in the region is to ensure a more coordinated and coherent approach at the national level. Security sector agencies will need to integrate and coordinate their border management activities. The United Nations counter terrorism entities (CTITF, CTED), UNOWA and UNODC will lead United Nations efforts to help countries in the region establish coordinating mechanisms to counter terrorism and fight organized crime, so that police, border guard, the army, customs and national security advisors work together in a coherent manner and in compliance with human rights and the rule of law. A mechanism for sharing information among coordinating mechanisms in neighboring countries will also be established. It is expected that a first project in the Sahel area will be piloted in Burkina Faso this year by CTITF and CTED, in collaboration with relevant United Nations entities under the CTITF Integrated

Assistance for Countering Terrorism (I-ACT) initiative. Once other projects in the region are established, support will be given to the development of a regional network that would contribute to building an effective regional early warning mechanism. (CTITF, CTED, UNOWA, UNODC)

- (ii) Use the United Nations Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force as a coordination platform for United Nations counter terrorism entities to propose country-focused solutions for implementation of the United Nations Global counter terrorism strategy in the Sahel, including its pillar IV on respect for human rights for all and the rule of law, as the basis for the fight against terrorism. (CTITF, UNOWA)
- (iii) Strengthen efforts to facilitate the delivery of technical counter-terrorism capacity-building assistance for police, prosecutors and the judiciary in the Sahel countries, with full respect for human rights. (CTITF, CTED, UNDP, DPKO)
- (iv) Support the upgrading of law enforcement and judicial training institutions curricula and improve skills and techniques pertaining to in-depth investigations in line with international human rights law and rule of law standards. This includes improving cooperation between law enforcement and justice institutions. Special emphasis would be placed on drugs and arms trafficking, trafficking in human beings, terrorist activities and financial investigations. (UNODC)
- (v) Further improve the effectiveness of the law enforcement and judicial response to money-laundering and financial crime. This would require all authorities concerned to systematically pursue an asset-oriented approach when investigating or prosecuting cases related to illicit trafficking or terrorism, to actively engage with their country's financial intelligence unit, and to further develop or strengthen national regimes on the identification, seizure, confiscation and management of proceeds of crime. (UNODC)

Objective 2.3: Enhance national capacities for effective border management, including through improved coordination between relevant national institutions.

Indicative actions:

- (i) Promote the development of national, integrated and comprehensive counter- terrorism strategies that would include a border security component. (CTITF, CTED)

- (ii) Support the development of customs information sharing and analysis units for effective border control. (CTED, CTITF)
- (iii) Support the implementation, or enhancement, of automated data management systems at border crossings, with links to national and international alert databases for the purpose of detecting and preventing the cross-border movement of terrorists and other criminals. (CTED, CTITF)
- (iv) Raise awareness among and train frontline customs officials on the detection and prevention of the illicit movement of cash and bearer negotiable instruments and on how to combat drugs and arms trafficking. (CTITF, CTED, UNODC)
- (v) Provide advice to the governments of the region on how to develop effective border management strategies, in line with international human rights standards. This would include advice on best practices with regard to the establishment of coordinated border controls by relevant agencies at the national level and with neighbouring states aimed at addressing illicit trafficking and cross-border movements of criminals, including terrorists, and the scaling up of border management capacity in so called 'hub cities' where large quantities of illicit goods transit. (UNODC, UNOWA).

Objective 2.4: Strengthen regional capacities to tackle terrorism and transnational organized crime.

Indicative actions:

- (i) Support the AU in the implementation of the Conclusions of the meeting on security cooperation and the operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in the Sahelo-Saharan region, held in Mauritania on 17 March 2013. (UNOWA, UNODC, CTED)
- (ii) Provide technical assistance and support to the implementation of the ECOWAS Praia Political Declaration and Regional Action Plan to Combat Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organised Crime and Drug Abuse in West Africa 2008-2015. (UNODC, UNOWA, DPKO)
- (iii) Support regional and sub-regional organisations and their mechanisms, such as the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) to enable enhanced information and best practice sharing. (UNOWA, CTITF, CTED)

Objective 2.5: Enhance regional and inter-regional cooperation amongst Sahel, West African and Maghreb states including through the development of harmonized approaches aimed at fighting illicit trafficking, controlling arms and movements of armed and criminal elements, including terrorists, and reinforcing the 1267 arms embargo.

Indicative actions:

- (i) Strengthen existing sub-regional judicial cooperation mechanisms, notably the Regional Judicial Platform for Sahel countries and the West African Network of Central Authorities and Prosecutors, especially with regards to the drafting and processing of mutual legal assistance and extradition requests in line with international human rights law and rule of law standards. (UNODC, CTED)
- (ii) Sensitize the governments of the Sahel, as well as civil society actors on the United Nations international standards on small arms (ISACS) (2012) developed under the United Nations-Coordinating Action on Small Arms (UN-CASA), which provide clear guidance on how to put in place and maintain controls on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). Efforts will also be made help countries in the region fully implement the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons. (UN-CASA)
- (iii) Building on the conclusions of CTITF-UNCCT / CTED Conference on border control cooperation in the Sahel and the Maghreb, which was held in Rabat from 13 to 15 March 2013, facilitate the convening of annual meetings of border control and security officials (customs, border police and intelligence officials) of the concerned States with a view to developing expert networks and strengthening information exchange and border-control cooperation in compliance with human rights. (CTED, CTITF, Al-Qaida Monitoring team)
- (iv) Support the establishment of bilateral or multilateral agreements, MOUs or other arrangements, to enable cooperation and coordination of border control efforts in West Africa and the Sahel. (CTED, UNOWA)
- (v) Sustain an up-to-date sanctions regime on Al Qaida and affiliates under the 1267 regime (UNSC2083). This will include a regional meeting of intelligence services to exchange information on the threat from Al Qaida and affiliates and update information relevant to the 1267 targeted sanctions regime. (United Nations Al Qaida/Taliban Monitoring Team)
- (vi) Support efforts to improve communication and exchange of intelligence, in line with international human rights standards, between airports in Latin America, West Africa, the Sahel, the Maghreb and Europe in order to tackle illicit trafficking at source, transit and destination, including by enforcing relevant travel bans. (UNODC)

- (vii) Improve coordination among concerned states to combat illicit trafficking of cultural property and protect Mali's ancient manuscripts and other types of protected movable cultural heritage, in accordance with the provisions of the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, in particular its Article 9, and the United Nations International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) "Convention on stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects" (1995). (UNESCO, MINUSMA)

STRATEGIC GOAL THREE: HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT PLANS AND INTERVENTIONS ARE INTEGRATED TO BUILD LONG-TERM RESILIENCE

Multi-sectoral approaches are required to build the resilience of the Sahelian people by bridging humanitarian and development programming in order to address the underlying causes and consequences of food and nutrition insecurity and other vulnerabilities, as well as to promote long-term development. Coherent, mutually reinforcing and harmonized planning and implementation of humanitarian and development activities will help deliver a successful resilience package to the most vulnerable communities. Food and nutritional security will remain at the centre of the resilience strategy. The following objectives and indicative actions are central to this effort:

Objective 3.1: Support local, national and regional stakeholders to better identify and track vulnerable households, in a participatory manner.

Indicative actions:

- (i) Ensure effective national and regional disaggregated data collection and information management to enable better identification and tracking of vulnerable populations. (OCHA, WFP, UNICEF, UNFPA)
- (ii) Support mechanisms and networks in the region ("Cadre harmonise", PREGEC and RPCA) in the delivery of quality and timely food security and nutrition information and analysis to effectively guide decision-making and mobilize preventative and early action. (FAO, WFP, UNICEF).

Objective 3.2: Help governments and other stakeholders provide equitable and effective coverage of basic social services and promote effective social protection systems.

Indicative actions:

- (i) Support the development of effective monitoring systems. (UNICEF)

- (ii) Ensure that vulnerable populations have access to adequate and inclusive basic social services without discrimination, social protection and safety nets, as the basis for building and protecting human capital and assets and reducing the vulnerability of households to internal and external shocks. (UNICEF, UNDP, WFP)
- (iii) Support the development and implementation of comprehensive, national social protection policies and laws and corresponding institutional and budgetary frameworks, in line with national and international human rights standards. (UNDP, UNWOMEN, UNICEF, ILO)
- (iv) Support the development and implementation of policies, strategies and budgetary frameworks specific to nutrition. (UNICEF, WHO, WFP, FAO)
- (v) Ensure that communities are provided with information on the availability of basic services to facilitate community participation in the identification of constraints, as well as the design of local solutions for improving community resilience, including reinforcing their capacity to demand basic services. (UNICEF, IOM, WFP)

Objective 3.3: Strengthen household, national and regional risk management capacities.

Indicative actions:

- (i) Support regional-level initiatives and cooperation on Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRR/M). (UNDP, UNESCO, WFP)
- (ii) Strengthen and promote participatory risk management capacities at the local, national and regional levels. (UNDP, UNWOMEN, OCHA, UNICEF, IOM, WFP)
- (iii) Support the establishment of national and regional food security stocks, with the aim of regulating markets and covering transitory food needs. (WFP)
- (iv) Reinforce national and regional humanitarian supply mechanisms for timely and effective response delivery. (UNICEF, WFP, IOM)
- (v) Support behavioural change communication strategies to promote individual and societal changes leading to adoption of practices that strengthen individual and family resilience, including through promotion of better nutrition. (UNWOMEN, UNICEF, UNFPA)
- (vi) Map and encourage the use of indigenous knowledge to inform Early Warning Systems (EWS), and strengthen networks of vulnerable groups around advocacy issues identified through the Participatory Vulnerability Analysis. (UNESCO)

Objective 3.4: Strengthen sustainable livelihoods.

Indicative actions:

- (i) Map livelihoods and the capacities of economic actors at the national level, and provide support to sustainable livelihoods and the creation of employment, including sustainable jobs, with just and favourable conditions of work. (UNDP, ILO, FAO)
- (ii) Protect the productive capacities of populations by supporting the development of programmes that have a bearing on nutrition, including agriculture and food security, poverty reduction and development, public health, education and social protection. (UNICEF, FAO, WFP, WHO)
- (iii) Provide enhanced agricultural and pastoral livelihood opportunities through increased investment, use of resistant seeds and species, rural extension services, and new infrastructure. (FAO, WFP, IFAD)
- (iv) Strengthen small farmers' links to the private sector by facilitating access to inputs, improving access to markets, and strengthening value chain systems. (FAO, IFAD, WFP)
- (v) Support land ownership rights and responsibilities at the local and national levels. (FAO, IOM)
- (vi) Promote alternative livelihoods through the development of value chains, the promotion of food processing and micro enterprises, access to rural microcredit, vocational training, and the promotion of regional trade and access to sustainable energy, including solar energy and green jobs. (UNDP, FAO, UNESCO, UNEP, ILO)
- (vii) Promote and support employment schemes linked to maintaining, rehabilitating and improving essential infrastructure and productive assets. (ILO, WFP, FAO,)
- (viii) Support and protect farmers by ensuring access to reliable rural microcredit facilities, crop insurance schemes and other financial services. (WFP, FAO, UNCDF)
- (ix) Support the mapping of local knowledge of livelihoods and local coping and resilience-enhancing mechanisms. (OCHA, UNDP, WFP)

Objective 3.5 Promote environmental sustainability through national and regional natural resource management mechanisms and climate change adaptation and mitigation programmes, with a special focus on water.

Indicative actions:

- (i) Support the systematic integration of poverty reduction and environment sustainability policies and programs with legal frameworks that encourage the preservation of eco-systems, land use and territorial planning, with emphasis on ecologically integrated approaches. (UNDP, UNEP)
- (ii) Provide technical assistance to and strengthen the capacity of the CILSS and other sub- regional bodies on regional natural resource management. (FAO, UNEP, UNDP)
- (iii) Scale up farmer-based management of natural resources, livestock and other productive activities. (FAO, WFP, IFAD)
- (iv) Strengthen water and land management mechanisms and provide technical assistance and capacity building to the Senegal, Niger River Basins and Lake Chad Authority. (UNEP, UNESCO)
